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1 Introduction
In representative democracies, periodic elections are the main instrument through
which voters can hold politicians accountable. A broad lesson from the growing
literature on political economy is that electoral accountability should benefit vot-
ers through two main channels. First, elections enable voters to selectively retain
good incumbents. If politicians have heterogeneous preferences, for example,
then politicians with preferences which are close to those of the electorate should
face a higher re-election probability. Second, electoral accountability constrains
opportunistic behavior by incumbents. If the payoffs from future terms in office
are sufficiently large, then the threat of being replaced by a challenger should re-
duce politicians’ willingness to implement policies which are not in the interests
of the electorate.
From this perspective term limits, which limit politicians to a maximum num-
ber of terms in office, are a curious intervention into the political process. In the
presence of term limits voters are unable to retain good politicians who face a
binding term limit. Furthermore, term limits will reduce or, in the case of a bind-
ing term limit, eliminate the incumbent’s payoffs from future periods in office,
which reduces voters’ ability to punish opportunistic behavior by threatening to
replace the incumbent with a challenger. It would therefore not be surprising if
voters were strongly opposed to term limits.
However, the opposite seems to be the case in practice. Opinion polls suggest
substantial support for term limits among voters from all sides of the political
spectrum. Carey et al. (2000) document that large majorities of voters supported
the introduction of term limits in a series of referenda in the US states during
the 1990s. Term limits are not only popular, but also widely used. In the United
States several states have limited their governor to a maximum number of terms
in office since the founding of the United States.1 Currently, in the United States
1See Grofman and Sutherland (1996) for a history of term limits in the United States.
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the office of the president, over two-thirds of state governors and many other
politicians in the state executive face term limits.2
In this paper we address this apparent puzzle. We argue that term limits can
in fact serve the interests of voters – even though elections do indeed have a
disciplining effect on politicians. We analyze a model in which politicians can
be of one of two types: some are “public-spirited,” with payoffs that coincide
with those of the electorate, while others have biased preferences. The key idea
behind our results is that the incentives created by electoral accountability may
not only reduce opportunistic behavior by biased politicians, but may also distort
the behavior of public-spirited politicians. The reason is that the payoffs from
future periods in office can make even public-spirited politicians unwilling to
take actions that are in the interests of voters today, if doing so reduces their re-
election prospects.
In this context limiting politicians to a finite number of terms in office can be
an attractive institution. Consider a restriction to at most two terms in office. This
reduces the value of staying in office after the first term and it changes the political
equilibrium in our model sharply. It is immediate that politicians will follow their
own preferences in their second term in office, when re-election is not an option.
However, the reduced payoff from re-election ensures that politicians in their first
term will also be less inclined to implement policies that would enhance their re-
election probability but are not in line with their own policy preferences. We
refer to this as the “truthfulness effect” of term limits. Furthermore, increased
truthfulness reduces the re-election probability of biased incumbents. As past
policy choices become a better indicator of the true preferences of the incumbent,
it is easier for voters to detect and remove biased politicians. We refer to this as
the “selection effect” of term limits.
Our main contribution is to show that the combination of the truthfulness and
2See Johnson and Crain (2004) for an overview of the use of term limits outside the United
States.
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selection effect can make term limits preferable from the perspective of voters rel-
ative to a situation without term limits. The welfare impact of truthfulness is in
general ambiguous: truthfulness by public-spirited politicians must be beneficial,
but truthfulness of biased politicians will not. However, the welfare implications
of the selection effect induced by more truthful behavior are unambiguously pos-
itive. An increase in voters’ ability to weed out politicians who do not share their
preferences must increase the voters’ utility. Our first main result is, that if the
costs of more truthful behavior are small (they could even be negative), then the
positive selection effect will ensure that two-term limits increase voter welfare.
We next consider the choice between two-term limits and the alternatives of
one-term limits and three-term or even longer term limits. We show under what
conditions two-term limits dominate these alternatives from the perspective of
voters. The key result that emerges is that the optimal length of term limits de-
pends critically on the discount rate of politicians, with higher discount rates
making longer term limits more attractive. The intuition is that high discount
rates reduce the payoff of politicians from staying in office, which reduces the
role of term limits as an institution to reduce the continuation payoffs of politi-
cians.
Our finding that the political equilibrium in the absence of term limits can
distort the incentives of both biased and public-spirited politicians is related to
the growing literature which shows that reputational concerns can result in very
inefficient equilibria. Morris (2001), for example, shows that an informed advi-
sor who shares the preferences of the decision maker can have an incentive to
lie about his information if telling the truth would induce the decision maker to
think that he is a biased advisor. If the advisor cares sufficiently about his rep-
utation, then no information is transferred to the decision maker in equilibrium.
A related idea is developed in Ely and Va¨lima¨ki (2003), who look at a market
in which long-lived players interact with a series of short-lived players. They
show that there can be a complete market failure if the long-lived players are too
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concerned about their future reputations.
Some recent work has applied similar ideas to political economy environ-
ments. Maskin and Tirole (2004), building on Canes-Wrone et al. (2001), com-
pare the relative efficiency of representative democracy, direct democracy and
judical power in a simple two-period model. They show that strong re-election
incentives can induce politicians to “pander” to public opinion. They find that
in this case representative democracy is strictly inferior to the other two alterna-
tive institutions. In contrast, our focus is the interaction between term limits and
incumbents’ re-election incentives in a representative democracy. Glazer (2003)
shows that both good and bad politicians may have an incentive to take decisions
prematurely if good politicians are able to respond faster to a new problem than
bad politicians.
The most influential explanation for term limits for members of congress was
introduced by Dick and Lott (1993) and Buchanan and Congleton (1994) and is
developed further in Chari et al. (1997). They argue that politicians’ ability to
transfer resources to their districts increases in their tenure in office relative to the
tenure of other delegates. This seniority bonus makes it costly for voters from one
district to unilaterally not re-elect their incumbent, which in turn allows senior
incumbents to extract rents. They show that one solution to this dilemma are
term limits, which reduce the average tenure of politicians and make it less costly
to punish bad behavior by incumbents.
An alternative explanation for term limits, which is not limited to a congres-
sional setting, is introduced by Tabarrok (1996) and formalized in Glaeser (1997).
In this model a right-wing and a left-wing party have an equal probability of
wining the first election. However, an exogenous incumbency advantage ensures
that the party which wins the first election is also re-elected for further terms in
office. If voters are sufficiently risk averse then a term limit after each term, which
eliminates the incumbency advantage, can increases the ex ante utility of both the
left-wing and right-wing party.
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Closest in spirit to our analysis is the almost entirely informal discussion in
Glazer and Wattenberg (1996). They argue that in a world without term limits
the spoils of future periods in office may generate excessive incentives for politi-
cians to secure their re-election. To improve their re-election prospects politicians
are assumed to divert time from important legislative work, which is viewed
as a public good, to narrow services for their constituencies. They argue that
term limits would reduce the value of gaining re-election and induce politicians
to concentrate more on legislative work. Our model will capture the effect that
term limits reduce the value of holding office and will make precise under what
circumstances this mechanism can improve the welfare of voters.3
There are two important differences between our approach and the existing
literature on term limits. First, our approach explicitly considers the accountabil-
ity effect of elections, which constrains the behavior of bad incumbents.4 Second,
our approach provides a natural explanation for why term limits that take effect
after an incumbent’s second - or even later - term in office can be optimal for
voters. In contrast, the mechanisms identified in the existing literature on term
limits, only justify the use of one-term limits. To account for longer term limits
they would have to be combined with a non-linear payoff from tenure, which first
increases but later declines. However, the peculiar combination of a limited num-
ber of re-election possibilities followed by a certain removal from office, which is
present under two-term or longer term limits, seems to be empirically prominent.
In the United States, for example, not only the president but also over two-thirds
of state governors currently face two-term limits.5
3Two further explanations for term limits are developed in Konrad and Torsvik (1997), where
the optimal provision of incentives for a bureaucrat requires that the politician is removed from
office after every period, and Adams and Kenny (1986), where term limits are used as a substitute
for elections to implement an optimal tenure for politicians. See Lopez (2003) and Tabarrok (1994)
for surveys of the term limits literature.
4Empirical evidence from gubernatorial elections that accountability does indeed influence the
behavior of politicians is presented in Besley and Case (1995a, 2003) and List and Sturm (2006).
5List and Sturm (2006) document the use of two-term limits for US governors. Carey et al.
(2000) survey the recent introduction of term limits in a number of US state legislatures which
6
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section intro-
duces the model. Section 3 analyzes the properties of the model in the absence of
term limits. Section 4 investigates the impact of term limits. Section 5 discusses a
number of extensions of the basic model and the final section concludes.
2 Model
We develop a simple infinite horizon political agency model. The political agency
literature originated with Barro (1973) and recent contributions include Banks
and Sundaram (1998), Coate and Morris (1995), Besley and Burgess (2002) and
List and Sturm (2006). Besley (2006) provides a synthesis of this literature. The
next subsection introduces the economic environment and the following subsec-
tion introduces the equilibrium definition.
2.1 Economic environment
We consider an infinitely repeated game between a single voter and a sequence
of elected politicians. In each period, the incumbent makes a policy decision
xt ∈ {0, 1}. The payoff from the two possible actions on the policy issue depends
on a state of nature st ∈ {0, 1}. The voter’s per period payoff from the decision is
v(xt, st) = xtst + (1− xt)(1− st), (1)
i.e. the voter receives a payoff of one if xt = st and zero otherwise. The realiza-
tions of the state st are independent draws from a distribution with p = Prob(st =
0) and we assume that p > 1/2, i.e. the voter believes ex ante that action xt = 0 is
the right choice.
Each incumbent politician may be of one of two types θ ∈ {B, G}. Type G
agents will be referred to as “good” and type B agents as “bad” politicians. Good
politicians are public-spirited officials who derive utility from implementing the
also permit at least two terms in office.
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policy that is in the interest of the voter. The payoff of a good politician from
choosing xt in any period when he is in office is just
uG(xt, st) = v(xt, st). (2)
Bad politicians’ preferences are similar, but they are biased in favor of choosing
xt = 1. The payoff of a bad politician from choosing xt when he is in office
depends on a state of nature rt ∈ {0, 1} and is
uB(xt, rt) = xtrt + (1− xt)(1− rt). (3)
The realizations of rt are independent draws from a distribution with Prob(rt =
0) = q. We assume that q < p and Prob(rt = 1|st = 1) = 1. That is, when a good
politician would like to choose xt = 1 then a bad politician agrees. However,
bad politicians prefer to choose xt = 1 strictly more often than good politicians.
Finally, we assume that bad politicians’ preferences satisfy the restriction p >
1− (p− q). The right hand side of this inequality is the per period payoff to the
voter of a bad politician who sets xt = rt in every period. The inequality places
a lower bound on the bias in bad politicians’ preferences and ensures that the
agency problem is sufficiently severe.
The probability that a randomly chosen politician is good is pi0. Let pit be the
updated belief of the voter about the probability that the incumbent is good at
the beginning of period t, which will also be referred to as the politician’s repu-
tation at date t. Both types of politicians and the voter discount future payoffs
relative to current payoffs with a discount factor β = 1/(1+ δ) < 1 where δ is the
discount rate. When not in office both types of politicians receive a reservation
utility which is normalized to zero. Finally, we assume for simplicity that elec-
toral defeat is an absorbing state in the sense that politicians who are voted out
of office never return to holding political office.
Timing and information structure of the game are as follows. At the beginning
of each period nature reveals the state st and rt. The key informational assump-
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tion is that both rt and st are observed by the incumbent but not by the voter.6 In
Section 5 we return to this assumption and show that our results are unchanged
as long as there is some critical level of asymmetric information between the in-
cumbent and the voter. After observing the state of nature the politician chooses
xt which is observed by everybody. At the end of each period there is an election
in which the voter decides whether to retain the incumbent (et = 1) or to chose
the challenger (et = 0), who is of the good type with probability pi0.
2.2 Equilibrium definition
We characterize Markov perfect equilibria of this game, i.e. equilibria in strategies
that only condition on payoff relevant information. A strategy for good incum-
bents is a function
λG(pit, st) = Prob(xt = 1|pit, st). (4)
which specifies the probability with which he implements xt = 1 as a function of
his reputation and the state of nature. Similarly a strategy for bad incumbents is
a function
λB(pit, rt) = Prob(xt = 1|pit, rt). (5)
A strategy for the voter is a rule σ(xt, pit) that determines whether the incumbent
is retained (σ = 1) or replaced by the challenger (σ = 0). When the voter is
indifferent between the incumbent and the challenger we assume that the voter
re-elects the incumbent.7
A Markov perfect equilibrium is a strategy for each agent-type that is a best
response to others’ given beliefs, and a sequence of beliefs {pit} that evolves in a
way consistent with Bayes’ rule. At the end of period t, after the current action
6Allowing both types of politicians to observe both states does not a priori preclude the possi-
bility that bad politicians implement the optimal policy for the voter in every period.
7When we consider term limits, strategies will also condition on how many terms an incum-
bent has already served in office, as this becomes payoff relevant in the presence of term limits.
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has been chosen, the updated beliefs of the voter about the incumbent are
p˜it = Prob(θ = G|xt, pit). (6)
The reputation of the incumbent in office at the beginning of period t+ 1 is there-
fore
pit+1 =
{
p˜it if et = 1
pi0 if et = 0.
(7)
Note that p˜it depends implicitly on the equilibrium strategies λθ through their
impact on updated beliefs about the quality of retained incumbents.
The strategies are best responses if they are solutions to the value functions
of incumbents and the voter. To formalize this, let P(xt|θ) denote the probabil-
ity distribution on xt induced by the current strategy of type θ, and let P(xt) =
pitP(xt|G) + (1− pit)P(xt|B) be the unconditional distribution on xt. The value
function for a good incumbent is
UG(pit) = max
λG(pit,st)
E
[
uG(λG(pit, st), st)
]
+ β ∑
xt
P(xt|G)σ(xt, pit)U(p˜it). (8)
The value function for a bad incumbent is defined analogously. The value func-
tion for the voter is
V(pit) = E
[
v(λθ(pit, st), st)
]
+β ∑
xt
P(xt) max
σ(xt,pit)
[σ(xt, pit)V(p˜it) + (1− σ(xt, pit))V(pi0)] (9)
where now the expectation is over both st and θ, given the voter’s current beliefs
pit.
3 Equilibrium with infinitely repeated elections
We now turn to the political equilibria of the game in the absence of term limits.
To what extent can elections create incentives for incumbents to make decisions
that are in the voter’s interests? It turns out that the electoral incentives may be
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rather limited in this model. Consider first the following equilibrium strategies,
which we will refer to as the “timid” equilibrium: Both types of politicians choose
xt = 0 if pit = pi0 and play a “truthful” strategy, i.e. good politicians choose
xt = st and bad politicians xt = rt, for any other pit. The voter re-elects if xt = 0
and fires the incumbent otherwise.
Given that both types always choose xt = 0 on the equilibrium path, both
the challenger and the incumbent, regardless of type, generate the same contin-
uation payoff for the voter. It is therefore a best response for the voter to re-elect
the incumbent after observing xt = 0. Given the equilibrium strategies, it is also
optimal for the voter to fire incumbents who have selected xt = 1 if out of equi-
librium beliefs are that incumbents who chose xt = 1 are of the bad type. In this
case our assumption that p > 1− (p− q) ensures that the voter prefers to fire the
incumbent after observing xt = 1.
For the strategy of the incumbent to be a best response, it must be the case
that types who view xt = 1 as the right decision (when st = 1 or rt = 1) prefer to
forgo the current payoff to their preferred action (equal to 1) in order to remain in
office. Since in this equilibrium the value of office for a good politician is UG =
p/(1 − β) and for a bad politician is UB = q/(1 − β) < UG, this implies that
timid behavior is a best response for incumbents whenever 1 < βq/(1− β), or
β > 1/(1+ q). (10)
Our main result in this section is that the timid equilibrium is not just one
possible political equilibrium of the game without term limits, but that it is in
fact the Markov perfect equilibrium with the highest possible payoff to the voter:
Proposition 1 For sufficiently low discount rates, the Markov perfect equilibrium with
the highest possible payoff to the voter in the game without term limits is the “timid”
equilibrium.
The formal proof of this proposition is relegated to the appendix. Proposition
1 implies that for sufficiently low discount rates the voter is not only unable to
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induce the politician to implement the first-best policy, but that the best possible
outcome for the voter is one in which the politicians always ignore their private
information and implement xt = 0 in every period. Intuitively, low discount rates
make the payoff from future periods in office sufficiently high that incumbents
are unwilling to take actions that reduce their re-election probability, regardless
of how much this would increase utility in the short run.
The upper bound on the utility of the voter, which has been established in
proposition 1, is the benchmark against which we compare the impact of term
limits. The next section analyzes how term limits change the political equilibrium
and under what circumstances term limits can serve the interests of voters.
4 Term limits
In the last section we showed that for sufficiently low discount rates even public-
spirited politicians who care about the welfare of the voter are induced to behave
perversely, taking actions arbitrarily often that they know to be deleterious to
voter welfare. Evidently the problem is that the equilibrium behavior of voters
makes the continuation payoff following untruthful actions too high, and thus
the prospect of re-election too important to politicians, relative to the value of
short-run decisions.
One way out of this problem could be for the voter to announce that an incum-
bent’s probability of re-election in future will be lower, which would reduce the
anticipated continuation payoff to remaining in office and make truthful short-
run behavior more palatable.8 But, since the electorate cannot easily bind its fu-
ture behavior in this way, such an announcement is unlikely to be credible. In
this context, therefore, a constitutional restriction on the number of terms that an
incumbent can stay in office may serve as a commitment device for the electorate
8If the voter could perfectly precommit himself to a voting strategy for all future elections, it
is not difficult to show that there exists a profile of future voting rules that would implement the
first-best policy choices for the voter in every period.
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that can alter equilibrium behavior and might increase equilibrium welfare of the
voter.
We are first going to consider the case where politicians are limited to serve
at most two terms in office. This is the restriction on tenure which currently ap-
plies, for example, to the US president and also to more than two-thirds of US
governors. In section 4.3 below we consider the relative benefits of two-term lim-
its versus either shorter or longer term limits. The analysis of the central trade-
offs behind two-term limits will be the key to understanding the choice between
shorter and longer term limits.
4.1 Equilibrium with two-term limits
In the presence of two-term limits, there is now a unique Markov perfect equi-
librium of the game, in which incumbents’ strategies differ dramatically from the
timid behavior considered above. Now any incumbent politician has a strictly
dominant strategy which involves truthful behavior in each term he is in office,
i.e. xt = st and xt = rt for good and bad incumbents respectively. That truth-
ful behavior is a dominant strategy in an incumbent’s second term is immediate,
since a second-term incumbent is a “lame duck” with no prospect of re-election.
That behavior is also truthful in an incumbent’s first term in office follows from
the fact that the highest continuation payoff for a first-term incumbent is β, which
is strictly lower than the payoff from implementing his preferred policy in his first
term in office. To complete the equilibrium characterization, we must next solve
for the equilibrium re-election rule of the voter, which we relegate to the proof in
the appendix of the following proposition:
Proposition 2 There is a unique Markov perfect equilibrium in the presence of two-term
limits which involves “truthful” behavior by politicians in all periods. The voter re-elects
the incumbent if the incumbent implements xt = 0 during his first term in office and
replaces him with the challenger otherwise.
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This equilibrium stands in sharp contrast to the timid equilibrium in the ab-
sence of term limits. In the timid equilibrium low discount rates make re-election
so valuable that both types of politicians always implement the policy that en-
sures re-election. Under two-term limits, in contrast, both good and bad incum-
bents choose xt = 1 with strictly positive probability in their first term in office
even though this results in certain electoral defeat. The reason is that the now
much smaller payoff from re-election no longer dominates politicians’ payoffs
from implementing their preferred policy in their first term in office.
4.2 When can two-term limits help?
We now ask whether expected voter welfare could be higher with two-term limits
on incumbents than in the timid equilibrium of the infinite horizon game, which
Proposition 1 establishes as the equilibrium with the highest payoff for the voter
when discount rates are small. In the timid equilibrium, the voter’s expected
payoff in each period is just p, so that the expected present discounted value of
equilibrium welfare is
V∞ = p/(1− β). (11)
Equilibrium voter welfare in with two-term limits depends on the expected pay-
off obtained from first-term and second-term incumbents, and the probabilities
with which the two occur. Since all incumbents behave truthfully in all periods,
the expected payoff to the voter from an incumbent who is good with some prob-
ability pi is
v(pi) = 1− (1− pi)(p− q). (12)
A first-term incumbent is good with probability pi0, while a second-term incum-
bent is good with probability pi1 = pi0 p/P0 > pi0, where
P0 = pi0p + (1− pi0)q (13)
is the probability that a first-term incumbent chooses x1 = 0 and is re-elected.
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Relative to the timid equilibrium two-term limits induce both a truthfulness
and a selection effect. The reduced re-election incentive induces truthful behav-
ior by both types of incumbents in both periods in office. The truthfulness effect
of the term limit increases voter welfare if v(pi0) ≥ p and decreases it otherwise.
Additionally, truthful behavior induces a selection effect: Re-election rates for
both good and bad incumbents fall. However, re-election rates of bad incum-
bents, who are more likely to chose xt = 1, fall more than the re-election rate
of good incumbents. This implies that the average quality of politicians in their
second term in office will be higher than the average quality of first term incum-
bents. This must increase voter welfare since pi1 > pi0 and truthful behavior by
a good politician yields a higher payoff to the voter than truthful behavior by a
bad politician.
On balance, voter welfare might therefore rise or fall with the introduction
of two-term limits. To sort out these effects, we calculate expected voter welfare
with two-term limits from the value function
V = 1− (1− pi0)(p− q)
+β [pi0p(1+ βV) + (1− pi0)q(1− (p− q) + βV)] (14)
+β(1− P0)V,
which can be solved for V to obtain
V =
1
1− β
[
1− (1− pi0)(p− q) 1+ βq1+ βP0
]
. (15)
The second term in brackets in this expression is equal to the per-period expected
loss from the action of a bad politician, equal to p − q, multiplied by the dis-
counted average probability that a bad politician is in office. It is straightforward
to verify that V is an increasing function of pi and q and a decreasing function of
p. Moreover, V → 1/(1− β) > V∞ as pi → 1 or q → p. Thus we have:
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Proposition 3 For sufficiently low discount rates, expected voter welfare is higher with
two-term limits than without term limits if the proportion of good politicians is suffi-
ciently high, or the difference in preferences of good and bad politicians is sufficiently
small.
4.3 Two-term limits versus shorter or longer alternatives
Our analysis has so far concentrated on two-term limits, which are not only a
frequently used restriction on tenure but are also difficult to rationalize with other
models of the benefits of term limits. However, there are on the one hand also
cases of one-term limits and on the other hand of three-term or even longer term
limits. The presidents of several Latin American countries and the governor of
Virginia, for example, are subject to a one-term limit while a number of US states
that have introduced term limits for their state legislators that limit them to three
terms in office.
Consider first the benefits of one-term limits relative to two-term limits. Since,
it is the prospect of re-election that induces undesirable behavior from incum-
bents, it may seem more natural to impose one-term limits rather than two-term
limits. In fact, however, the voter will strictly prefer two-term limits to one-term
limits in this environment. In both cases, the strategies of both types of incum-
bents are identical (they are truthful) and, since good politicians are strictly more
likely to be re-elected to a second term than bad politicians, two-term limits in-
duce a positive selection effect that increases the average payoff to the voter rela-
tive to one-term limits.9 Summarizing this discussion, we have:
Proposition 4 In this model, two-term limits always yield a higher equilibrium payoff
for the voter than one-term limits.
We now turn to the trade-off between two-term limits versus longer limits.
9In section 5.3 we will return to the relative benefit of one versus two-term limits in the pres-
ence of ego rents.
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Consider first the choice between two-term and three-term limits. A politician
who is in his second term in the presence of three-term limits faces the same in-
centives as a politician in his first term under two-term limits. It is therefore a
dominant strategy for both types of politicians to behave truthfully in their sec-
ond and third term in office under three-term limits for any non-negative dis-
count rate. A sufficient condition for this also to be a dominant strategy for both
good and bad incumbents in their first term in office under three-term limits is
1 > β+ β2, which is satisfied for sufficiently large discount rates. It is straightfor-
ward to check that the voter’s optimal response to these strategies is to re-elect
the incumbent as long as the updated beliefs about the incumbent are larger than
pi0.
If politicians are sufficiently impatient that both types behave truthfully in
every term in office under three-term limits, then the voter’s utility must be
higher under three-term limits than under two-term limits. In this case the ex-
pected payoff of the voter during the first two terms of a three-term limit is the
same as under a two-term limit. However, under three-term limits the voter has
the additional possibility to retain politicians who are more likely to be of the
good type than a randomly drawn challenger for an additional term which can-
not reduce his welfare.
The same logic can be extended to even longer term limits. If discount rates
are sufficiently high to induce truthful behavior by incumbents under even longer
term limits, then such longer limits must dominate shorter restrictions on tenure.
In fact, there exists a critical discount rate above which an “infinite” term limit, i.e.
no term limit at all, dominates any finite term limit. If politicians are so impatient
that they behave truthfully even in the absence of term limits, then finite term
limits must be unambiguously welfare reducing for the voter, as they restrict his
ability to retain good incumbents. The results of this discussion are summarized
in the following proposition:
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Proposition 5 Sufficiently high discount rates ensure that expected voter welfare with
three-term or even longer limits is higher than with two-term limits.
While at high discount rates longer term limits dominate shorter term limits,
it is also not difficult to see under what circumstances the reverse will be the
case for low discount rates. Consider again the choice between two-term and
three-term limits when politicians are very patient. In this case a three-term limit
is incompatible with truthful behavior by politicians in all three terms in office.
The equilibrium will now involve pooling on either xt = 0 or xt = 1 during an
incumbent’s first term in office and truthful strategies for the second and third
term. If the voter prefers the political equilibrium in incumbents’ second and
third term under three-term limits (which is identical to the equilibrium under
two-term limits) to timidity, then he must prefer two-term limits to three-term
limits in this case. The same argument can be extended to the choice between
even longer term limits and two-term limits and we therefore have:
Proposition 6 At low discount rates expected voter welfare is higher under two-term
limits relative to longer term limits, whenever two-term limits yield a higher expected
payoff to the voter than the timid equilibrium.
5 Extensions
This section will discuss the implications of a number of extensions of the model.
The next subsection considers the incentives of different types of people to be-
come politicians. The following section considers the importance of asymmetric
information for our results. The next section explores the implications of adding
“ego rents” from holding office to the model and the final section considers the
implications of adding gains from tenure in office to the model.
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5.1 Endogenous types
So far we have assumed that the probability that a randomly chosen politician is
of the good type is exogenously given. Supporters of term limits frequently argue
that term limits will encourage different people to run for political office. We can
address this claim in our model by comparing the change in the value of holding
office for good and bad politicians as term limits are introduced.
The equilibrium payoffs of good and bad incumbents in the timid equilib-
rium without term limits are p/(1− β) and q/(1− β) respectively. If two-term
limits are introduced, then these payoffs change to 1+ βp and 1+ βq respectively.
Since p > q equilibrium payoffs of good politicians are higher than the payoffs
of bad politicians both in the absence and presence of term limits. The payoff of
good incumbents in the presence of term limits relative to the payoff in the timid
equilibrium simplifies to (1/p + β)(1− β). The same ratio for bad incumbents is
(1/q+ β)(1− β) which must be larger as p > q. The results of this discussion are
summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 7 Introduction of two-term limits causes the equilibrium value of office to
fall proportionately more for good than bad politicians, relative to the timid equilibrium
of the game without term limits.
How this change in the relative payoff of holding office for good and bad
incumbents affects the proportion of good types that seek political office clearly
depends on the distribution of outside options of good and bad types. If these are
sufficiently similar then the introduction of term limits would endogenously re-
duce the average quality of politicians. This mechanism has therefore the poten-
tial to overturn our finding that two-term limits can be beneficial if the proportion
of good types in the pool of possible politicians remains constant.
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5.2 More information
We have so far assumed a very simple form of asymmetric information between
politicians and the voter: Politicians perfectly observe the realization of the state
of nature at the beginning of each period while the voter never learns anything
about the state of nature. It is easy to see that some degree of asymmetric in-
formation is crucial for our results. Suppose, for example, that the voter could
also perfectly observe the realization of the state st. In the absence of term limits
the voter would then be able to enforce first-best policy-making, i.e. both types
of politicians choosing xt = st, if politicians are sufficiently patient. This equi-
librium would be sustained by a strategy for the voter to re-elect the incumbent
if xt = st and fire otherwise. It is also immediate that there would be no role
for term limits in this case. Two-term limits would still induce truthful behavior
by incumbents, which must be strictly worse for the voter than first-best policy-
making.
While some asymmetric information is therefore clearly crucial for our results,
our results do not depend on the extreme form of asymmetric information which
we have assumed so far. One way to relax this assumption is to assume that
with probability φ < 1 the state st is also revealed to the voter at the time of the
election. This change in assumptions has no impact on the equilibrium under
two-term limits. It is still a dominant strategy for both types of incumbents to
behave truthfully in both periods and as a consequence the voter only re-elects
the incumbent if the first term action was xt = 0.
Now consider the equilibria of the game without term limits. It is not difficult
to see that the timid equilibrium and also the other classes of equilibria character-
ized in the proof of proposition 1 continue to exist. For proposition 1 to continue
to apply, we only need to rule out that first-best policy making, i.e. both types of
politicians pool on xt = st, is an equilibrium. This equilibrium will not exist if
1 > φ
β
1− β (1− (p− q)). (16)
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The left hand side of (16) is the payoff to a bad incumbent from deviating from
this equilibrium strategy to choosing xt = 1 when rt = 1 and st = 0. The right
hand side of (16) is the expected punishment for this deviation from the first-best
policy. With probability φ the fact that st = 0 is revealed and the incumbent loses
his continuation payoff of (β/(1− β))(1− (p− q)). Clearly condition (16) holds
if φ is sufficiently small and the first-best equilibrium will therefore cease to exist
if there is a sufficiently large amount of asymmetric information. If we assume
that (16) is satisfied, then the upper bound on the utility of the voter established
in proposition 1 continues to hold and our results on the welfare effects of term
limits apply as before.
5.3 Ego rents
We have so far assumed that the only payoff from holding political office is the
utility that a politician derives from implementing the policy that he prefers. An
obvious extension would be to also allow that politicians receive a per period
“ego rent” R from holding office which is independent of their policy choices.
The presence of ego rents will reinforce the incentive of politicians to stay in of-
fice. Ego rents will therefore strengthen our finding in proposition 1 that the
timid equilibrium involves the highest possible payoff to voters for sufficiently
low discount rates in the absence of term limits.
Ego rents do, however, offer new possibilities in the presence of term limits.
If ego rents are sufficiently high it is possible that one-term limits are the optimal
institution for the voter. Suppose that p < 1− (1− pi0)(p− q) and 1 < β(1+ R).
It is not difficult to check that the equilibrium now either involves pooling on xt =
0 or xt = 1 during a politician’s first term in office and truthful behavior during
the second term in office. Condition p < 1− (1−pi0)(p− q) implies that the voter
prefers the second term behavior to the first term behavior of incumbents in these
equilibria. He must therefore prefer one-term limits which induces politicians’
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second term behavior under two-term limits in every period. If politicians are
largely motivated by ego rents from holding office rather than the utility they
derive from taking their preferred policy decisions there would therefore be scope
for one-term limits.
5.4 Gains from experience
A common argument advanced by opponents of term limits is that there are gains
to voters from having more experienced politicians in office. A very crude way of
capturing this concern in our model would be to add an exogenous payoff from
tenure in office to the model. Clearly, a sufficiently high payoff from tenure in
office can make term limits are very unattractive institution from the perspective
of voters.
A more interesting way of capturing gains from experience would be to as-
sume that good politicians cannot perfectly observe the state of nature s, but that
their ability to correctly determine the state of nature increases over time. Inter-
estingly, the benefits to voters of such increases in experience may be limited in
the absence of term limits. In the timid equilibrium of the game without term lim-
its both types of politicians always disregarded their private information about
the state of nature. Any improvement in politicians’ ability to determine the cor-
rect state of nature therefore does not benefit voters in this case. However, as
term limits change behavior from timidity to truthfulness, any improvement in
good politicians’ ability to determine the state of nature will directly improve
voter welfare. It is therefore not obvious that gains from experience must be an
argument against term limits.
6 Conclusion
At first sight, term limits seem paradoxical, as they reduce voters’ ability to hold
politicians accountable for their policy choices. We have developed a simple po-
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litical agency model to show that term limits can be in the interest of voters de-
spite the accountability effect of elections. The mechanism that drives our results
is that term limits reduce the value of holding office. This induces “truthful”
behavior by incumbents, which in turn enables the voter to selectively re-elect
higher quality agents to a second term in office. The combination of these two
effects can increase the utility of the voter ex ante.
In broader terms, our analysis is a contribution to an emerging “political the-
ory of the second best” that provides new insights into the design of electoral in-
stitutions. Agency problems in government are only partially resolved by having
open elections. In this context a term limit can be welfare enhancing – even when
the direct effect of term limits is unambiguously negative – because it interacts
with the other distortions in the political system. In this respect, our work paral-
lels Besley and Smart (2006), who use an agency model to study how a variety of
(non-electoral) restraints on government affect political incentives. The common
theme is that re-election rules chosen in equilibrium by fully rational voters will
not generally be optimal from their own point of view, because voters are unable
to pre-commit to use elections as an optimal incentive for their leaders. Thus,
in the present context, institutions like term limits that reduce the discretion of
voters may have unexpected and salutary effects on efficiency in government.
7 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: The proof proceeds in three steps. The first step shows
that the timid equilibrium is the best pooling equilibrium from the perspective
of the voter. The second step shows that all equilibria which involve a pooling
strategy for the politicians at some pi 6= pi0 are worse than the timid equilibrium
for the voter. The final step shows that for sufficiently low discount rates there is
no equilibrium which involves non-pooling strategies for all pi.
23
Step 1 Apart from the timid equilibrium there is only one other pure strategy
pooling equilibrium. In this alternative equilibrium both types of incumbents
always choose xt = 1 and the voter re-elects if xt = 1 and fires otherwise. These
strategies are an equilibrium if the no deviation conditions 1 < (1− p)β/(1−
β) and 1 < (1 − q)β/(1 − β) for good and bad incumbents respectively hold.
Equilibrium payoff of the voter in this equilibrium is (1− p)/(1− β), which is
lower than the payoff in the timid equilibrium, which is p/(1− β), as we assume
that p > 1/2.
We will now rule out that there can be any mixed strategy pooling equilibria.
To simplify the notation we will use σ1 instead of σ(xt = 1, pit) and σ0 instead
of σ(xt = 0, pit) if this does not cause confusion. Suppose first that the bad type
randomizes between xt = 1 and xt = 0 if the state is rt = 1. For this to be an
equilibrium, it has to be the case that 1+ σ1βUB = σ0βUB where UB = q/(1− β),
which implies that
(σ0 − σ1) = δ/q (17)
As the timid equilibrium exists whenever δ < q equation (17) cannot be satisfied
for any σ1 and σ0, if the voter re-elects the incumbent if he is indifferent. The
argument for the case in which the bad type randomizes in state rt = 0 and the
cases in which the good type randomizes in either state st = 1 or st = 0 are
analogous.
Step 2 Pooling at some pˆi 6= pi0. We show that the voter’s payoff in any such
equilibrium can be no higher than in the timid equilibrium. From step 1 we know
that the only pooling equilibria involve either both types always choosing xt = 0
or xt = 1. In either case this implies that on the equilibrium path p˜i(xt, pˆi) = pˆi.
To support pooling at pˆi, it must be the case that σ(p˜i, xt) > 0 for at least one
xt: otherwise, both types would play the truthful (and non-pooling) strategies
λG(pˆit, st) = st and λB(pˆit, rt) = rt. Since re-election is a best response for the
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voter,
V(p˜i(x, pˆi)) = V(pˆi) ≥ V(pi0) (18)
In step 1 we have shown that the timid equilibrium has a payoff of p/(1 − β)
for the voter and that this is the highest payoff to the voter among all pooling
equilibria. Hence we have
p
1− β ≥ V(pˆi) ≥ V(pi0) (19)
which completes this step.
Step 3 Non-pooling strategies for all pi. First, consider strategies where Pθx > 0,
where Pθx is the probability that an agent of type θ chooses action x. We first show
that in any such equilibrium there would exist a value of pi < 1 above which the
incumbent is re-elected with probability one regardless of his policy choice. If
Pθx > 0 Bayes’ rule implies that updated beliefs at each action can be written as
p˜ix(pi) =
pi
pi + (1− pi)κx(pi) (20)
where κx = PBx /PGx is the likelihood ratio given strategies at pi. Thus
g(pi) ≡
∣∣∣∣ 1p˜i1 − 1p˜i0
∣∣∣∣ = 1− pipi |κ1(pi)− κ0(pi)| (21)
Define
K∗ = max
pi∈[0,1]
|κ1(pi)− κ0(pi)| (22)
and let g∗(pi) = K∗(1− pi)/pi. By construction, (21) implies g(pi) ≤ g∗(pi) for all
pi ∈ [0, 1]. Since g∗ is continuous in pi and g∗(1) = 0, g∗(pi) → 0 as pi → 1. Since
0 ≤ g(pi) ≤ g∗(pi) and g∗(pi) → 0 as pi → 1, it follows that g(pi) also converges
to zero. Thus |p˜i1 − p˜i0| → 0 as pi → 1.
To prove the claim, suppose not, and let pi∗ = sup{pi : σ(pi) = 1}. Further, let
pˆi = inf{pi : 1− (1− pi)(p− q) > (1− β)V(pi0)} define the level of reputation
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above which truthful behavior by the incumbent is preferred by the voter to the
equilibrium behavior of the challenger. (Such a pˆi exists since Ev(λ, pi) < 1− (p−
q) for all λ and all pi < 1.) Since p˜i1(pi) → p˜i0(pi), there exists pi > max{pi∗, pˆi}
such that min{p˜i1, p˜i0} > pi∗; that is, the incumbent will be fired at pi regardless
of which action x is observed. Consequently, truthful behavior λθ(s) = sθ is the
unique best response for the incumbent and, since pi > pˆi, truthful behavior by
the incumbent is preferred to the equilibrium behavior of the challenger. Hence
σ(pi) = 1, a contradiction, and it follows there exists p¯i < 1 such that σ(pi) = 1
for all pi ≥ p¯i.
Since we assume hat Pθx > 0 it follows that max{p˜i0(pi), p˜i1(pi)} ≥ Ep˜i = pi.
For any pi ≥ p¯i, therefore, max{σ(p˜i0(pi)), σ(p˜i1(pi)} = 1: the incumbent has the
option to remain in office in all periods after achieving reputation pi by choosing
whichever action x causes reputation to rise. Thus we have, for all pi ≥ p¯i,
UB(pi) ≥ min{q, 1− q}1− β (23)
since the payoff to the action which induces re-election has expected payoff no
less than min{q, 1− q}.
Finally, consider the choice of the bad incumbent at any critical reputation pi
for which one action, say x = 0, induces a reputation p˜i0 ≥ p¯i, while the alterna-
tive action x = 1 induces a reputation p˜i1 < p¯i. Since for sufficiently low discount
rates min{q, 1− q}β/(1− β) > 1, at any such critical reputation both types of
incumbents would strictly prefer the action that results in certain re-election to
the action which entails σ = 01, which contradicts the hypothesis that Pθx > 0 for
all pi.
Finally, consider the possibility that for some pit one action reveals the incum-
bent to be of the good type with certainty and hence p˜it = 1, which is an absorbing
state. For sufficiently low discount rates bad types would deviate to this action as
this would enable them to stay in office forever and earn a payoff of 1 per period.
Similar arguments can be used to rule out that one action reveals the incumbent
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to be of the bad type with certainty. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2 In the main text we have already argued that it is a dom-
inant strategy for both types of incumbents to implement the policy that maxi-
mizes their per period utility. We now need to consider the voter’s optimal re-
election rule. Given the strategies of the politicians, the voter’s expected payoff
from an incumbent who is in his first term in office is pi0. Let pix1 denote her up-
dated beliefs about the type of the incumbent on observing x in the first term.
These are given by Bayes’ rule as:
pi11 =
pi0(1− p)
pi0(1− p) + (1− pi0)(1− q) < pi0 (24)
pi01 =
pi0 p
pi0 p + (1− pi0)q > pi0 (25)
Now let Px denote the probability that x is observed in the first term given the
equilibrium strategies and σx the corresponding re-election probabilities at the
end of the first term. In each period, if the incumbent is good with probability pi,
the payoff expected in the current period by the voter is
v(pi) = 1− (1− pi)(p− q) (26)
In choosing re-election rules, the voter’s problem is
V = v(pi0) + β ∑
x=0,1
Px max
σx
{σx(v(pix1) + βV) + (1− σx)V} (27)
Differentiation shows v(pix1) > (1− β)V implies σx = 1, and v(pix1) < (1− β)V
implies σx = 0. By definition, V ≥ v(pi0)/(1− β), so pi11 < pi0 implies v(pi11) <
v(pi0) ≤ (1 − β)V and σ1 = 0. To show σ0 = 1, suppose instead that σ0 < 1
were optimal for the voter. Then V = v(pi0)/(1 − β), and pi01 > pi0 implies
v(pi01) > v(pi0) = (1− β)V which implies σ0 = 1, a contradiction. Q.E.D.
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